Constitutional Law--Prospective Limitation of Mapp v. Ohio by Ketchum, Menis Elbert, II
Volume 68 | Issue 1 Article 7
December 1965
Constitutional Law--Prospective Limitation of
Mapp v. Ohio
Menis Elbert Ketchum II
West Virginia University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Menis E. Ketchum II, Constitutional Law--Prospective Limitation of Mapp v. Ohio, 68 W. Va. L. Rev. (1965).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol68/iss1/7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Prospective Limitation of Mapp v. Ohio
Unlawfully seized evidence was presented at petitioner's trial
and a conviction was obtained. The following year Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was announced. In Mapp, the Court
held that the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment was
required in state criminal trials by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Petitioner filed an application for habeas
corpus in the United States District Court on the ground that
he decision in Mapp acts retrospectively upon cases finally decided
in the period prior to Mapp. Relief was denied and the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Held, affirmed. The
majority stated that in determining whether a decision should be
applied retrospectively, the merits and demerits of the particular
case must be weighed. The court should examine the history of
the rule in question, its purpose and effect and whether retro-
spective application would further or retard its operation. The
purpose of Mapp is to deter unreasonable police action. The
majority justified its result on the basis that the abuse of police
power had already occurred and could not be corrected. Further-
more, applying Mapp retrospectively would tax the administration
of justice. Consequently, the purpose of Mapp would not be
advanced by making the rule retrospective. Mr. Justice Black, in
a sharp dissent, stated that Mapp's purpose was to protect defend-
ants' constitutional rights; therefore, persons convicted by un-
constitutional procedure should have the right to challenge their
conviction. Linkletter v. Walker, 85 Sup. Ct. 1731 (1965).
Prior to the decision in Linkletter, widespread controversy existed
as to whether the decision in Mapp should be applied retrospec-
tively. Two of the federal circuit courts applied the rule in Mapp
retrospectively. On the other hand, four of the federal circuit
courts limited the rule prospectively. Currier, Time and Change
in Judge-Made Law; Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201
(19(5). The state courts almost unanimously limited the decision
in Mapp prospectively. DOWLING & GUN'rnIE, CASES A MA-
TEmAS ON CoNSTrUTONAL LAW 803 (7th ed. 1965). Furthermore,
there was a wide split among legal commentators as to whether
Mapp should be applied retrospectively. Compare Note, Prospec-
tive Over-ruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts,
71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962) with Torcia & King, The Mirage of Retro-
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activity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66 DiCK L. Rgv.
269 (1962).
It is generally acknowledged that the Constitution does not
provide an answer to the question of retrospectivity of judicial
decisions. The Constitution has no voice upon the subject. Each
court may decide for itself whether to apply a ruling retrospectively.
Greater No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932).
In Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913), the defendant urged
that retrospective application of a judicial decision violated article
I, section 10 of the Constitution, which provides that "No State
shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts...." The Court rejected
this contention, enunciating the rule that this section of the Con-
stitution only prohibits legislative action and not judicial decisions.
Furthermore, where a judicial decision is applied retrospectively
there is no impairment of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924).
When land is taken through the retrospective application of a
judicial decision, the unsuccessful party is not deprived of due
process of law. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895).
In granting or denying retrospective operation of judicial de-
cisions prior to Linkletter, most courts took into consideration the
effect the decision would have on the party affected by the earlier
decision. Where the decision would affect contract rights, the
courts usually limited the decision prospectively. The rationale is
that a party who relies on a judicial decision when entering into a
contract should know with certainty that his rights will not be
destroyed by a new interpretation of the law. In Gelpcke v. City
of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1863), a city issued municipal securities
relying on a state decision construing the securities as valid. The
Supreme Court of the United States overruled the state decision
but refused to apply its new holding retrospectively because such
application would be an unjust punishment on the city.
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly settled the ques-
tion of retrospectivity, it has recently applied its decisions retro-
spectively in criminal cases where the retrospective application
would best benefit the imprisoned person. In Eskridge v. Wash-
ington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958),
the prisoner had been convicted of murder. Upon appeal he
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motioned for a free transcript of the trial. The motion was denied.
Subsequently, in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Court
held that a state must provide a free trial transcript to those
who cannot afford to pay. The prisoner in Eskridge was then
granted certiorari. The Court reversed and remanded, thereby
applying Griffin retrospectively. Similar treatment was afforded
a prisoner who had pleaded guilty without the assistance of
counsel and was convicted as a result of this omission. After his
conviction, the Supreme Court of the United States announced
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), establishing that the
right to counsel is a fundamental right. The prisoner attached his
conviction collaterally and the Court in Doughty v. Maxwell, 376
U.S. 202 (1964), in a per curiam opinion, ordered the prisoner a
new trial and thus made the Gideon decision retrospective.
The Court, however, distinguished the above cases from Link-
letter by applying a test suggested by some legal commentators.
The court must look to the purpose of the decision in question
and decide whether retrospective operation would further or re-
tract this purpose. Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive
Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962). Using
this criterion, the Court stated that retrospectivity was upheld in
the other constitutional areas because the principle they applied
went to the fairness of the trial. However, the Mapp decision
could not be retrospective because the purpose there was to deter
abusive police action which could not be corrected; consequently,
retrospective application would not further the purpose of Mapp.
It is doubtful that the Court's primary concern in Linkletter
was to deter abusive police action. It seems that the Court did
not give Mapp a retrospective application because to do so would
put a great stress on existing judicial machinery. A retrospective
application of Mapp would crowd criminal dockets with hearings
on the excludability of evidence, create additional expense and
result in the release of many guilty prisoners.
One of the major objections raised in the dissenting opinion
was that the majority is more concerned with the stress that a
retrospective application of Mapp would put on the judicial pro-
cess than with personal liberties. "If such is the result of enlight-
ened opinion, so be it. Such fears have not deterred courts before."
Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963). In other words,
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protection guaranteed by the Constitution should not be limited
lest our judicial machinery should become overburdened.
Moreover, the dissent points out that if the Court must limit
Mapp prospectively, it should at least allow Mapp to be applied
retrospectively in cases where the offense was committed after
the Mapp offense, but the conviction was made final before Mapp
was decided. Linldetter's offense was committed after the Mapp
offense, but his conviction was made final before Mapp. Is the
conviction of Linkletter impregnable to collateral attack because
his trial and appeal were pushed along at a faster pace than
Mapp's? If the Ohio courts had proceeded with the same speed
as the Louisiana courts, Linkletter's case would not have been
decided before the decision in Mapp; consequently, Linidetter
would have received direct relief after Mapp was decided.
The Linkletter decision represents the first time the Supreme
Court has limited its decision prospectively in a criminal case
involving constitutional rights. This raises the question of whether
the Court will limit its decisions prospectively in the future, where
constitutional issues similar to the one in Mapp are involved. In
trying to determine how the Court will decide in these areas,
one should be cautious when relying on precedent. The cases be-
fore Linkletter indicated a retrospective application might be
givefi Mapp; however, the Court distinguished these precedents
and limited the rule in Mapp prospectively. Consequently, no
generalization should be drawn in regard to retrospectivity in
criminal cases not yet adjudicated by the Supreme Court.
Menis Elbert Ketchum, II
Criminal Law-Administrative Law and the Right to
Trial by Jury
Ds were indicted for evasion of taxes owed for the years 1944,
1945, and 1946. The taxes were duly assessed by the commissioner
in 1955. The indictment charged Ds with wilfully attempting to
evade and defeat the payment of income taxes. In the criminal
prosecution, the jury was instructed that the assessments were
valid as a matter of law because the validity of an administrative
order cannot be passed upon by a jury. Held, reversed. In a
criminal prosecution of one charged with the commission of a
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